

The Army's 21st Century Quandary: Preparing for Today or Looking at Tomorrow?

**A Monograph
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<p>The Army's Operational Concept emphasizes that Army forces must be prepared to conduct a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations to create opportunities and achieve desired results. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report further outlines the need for a balanced force, capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict. This monograph questions whether the United States Army should attempt to maintain its full spectrum capability while fighting two counterinsurgency operations. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the United States Army has shifted the preponderance of training toward stability and counterinsurgency operations to meet the requirements in both Afghanistan and Iraq, leaving many units untrained on their core mission essential tasks (CMETL). The most recent national security policy documents and the Army's recently published doctrine require the United States Army to maintain a well balanced force, capable of operating in a very dynamic operational environment. The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War provides a case study supporting the requirements of a full spectrum force and the dangers of limiting the focus of an Army to a particular portion of the conflict spectrum. This monograph shows that the United States Army must develop the capacity to not only succeed in today's conflicts, but also must maintain CMETL capabilities to support future contingencies</p>					
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Abstract

The Army's 21st Century Quandary: Preparing for Today or Looking at Tomorrow? By LTC Edward T. Bohnemann, United States Army, 55 pages.

This monograph analyzes whether or not the United States Army should maintain its full spectrum capability while fighting two counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States Army doctrine, as well as the *2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Reports*, the *2006 National Security Strategy*, the *2008 National Defense Strategy*, and the *2004 National Military Strategy*, call upon the military, specifically the Army, to be able to react to a wide array of threats facing the country, in any operational environment. DoD Instruction 3000.05 further reinforces this full spectrum capability by stating that stability operations are a core mission set that the Department of Defense must be proficient in and prepared to execute. Due to the high operational tempo the Army has experienced since 2001, the Army has instituted the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle to man, equip, and train Brigade Combat Teams on a cyclical basis in preparation for their next deployment to theater. The time compressed nature of this cycle causes Brigades to attempt to balance core mission-essential tasks (CMETL) against directed mission-essential tasks (DMETL) designed to specifically support their next deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Over the past several years, commanders at all levels have hedged their training focus to support their in theater mission, leaving a training deficiency in CMETL competencies.

This question is examined through the lens of the current operational environment, with continual reference to strategic guidance and Army doctrine. A close examination of *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, provided additional doctrinal information concerning the importance of a full spectrum capable force in the current stability and counterinsurgency operations. A survey conducted at the United States Army Command and General Staff Officers Course provided the critical perspective of mid-grade officers about the challenges facing the operational force while operating in the dynamic operational environment of the 21st Century. This paper concludes with a case study of the 2006 Israeli – *Hezbollah* War and a close examination of the Israeli Defense Forces' combat readiness following six years of stability operations during the Second Intifada. Many similarities can be drawn between this crisis and the current scenario facing the United States Army in 2010, following eight years of continual combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This monograph concludes that the United States Army needs to maintain its full spectrum capability. The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed significant strain on the Army's ability to meet the requirements in those theaters. Yet, all strategic guidance, to include the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, acknowledges a very dynamic, rapidly changing, and often unpredictable operational environment, one for which the United States Army needs to be prepared.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Operational Environment of the 21 st Century	3
Challenges to the Operational Environment	5
Training Quandary for the United States Army	10
Landpower: Present Requirements versus Future Capability	15
Strategic Guidance	17
Training During an Era of Persistent Conflict	22
Case Study: 2006 Israeli – Hezbollah War	28
Preparations for War	30
The Realities of Combat in Lebanon	35
Aftermath	39
Conclusions and Recommendations	41
APPENDIX.....	46
BIBLIOGRAPHY	52
Books and Publications.....	52
Articles and Reports.....	53
Theses and Monographs.....	54
Websites and Pages.....	54

Introduction

This enemy is different from the one we war-gamed.
LTG William Wallace
V Corps Commander
Operation Iraqi Freedom¹

As the United States emerges from the first decade of the twenty-first century, the only constant in the operational environment facing it is change. This next decade will vary greatly from the previous one and will continue to surprise even the most ardent planners and commanders. The threats that face the country will continue to adapt to the capabilities of the United States military, continually seeking vulnerabilities to exploit and opportunities to create instability. Enemies will not look like those that faced the country during the Cold War in the Fulda Gap, nor will they completely look like those in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and will more likely combine conventional, unconventional, irregular, asymmetric, hybrid threats and criminal tactics to counter United States hegemony.² The challenge the military faces in the future is to not find itself in a situation where commanders on the ground are wondering about the viability of their war plans or the capabilities of their units in a rapidly changing operational environment.

Land power is the Army's contribution to the joint forces of the United States. These land forces are expected to dominate the environment by force or threat of force in order to control the land, its people and resources.³ In order to accomplish this mission, the Army's capstone doctrine outlined in *FM 3-0, Operations* discusses its Full Spectrum Operational Concept. This operational concept states: "Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations

¹ Pepe Escobar, "The Battle for Shi'ite Hearts and Minds." *Asia Times Online*, 29 March 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EC29AK07.html, (accessed November 10, 2009).

² U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operation*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2008), 1-3.

³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 1, The Army*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2005), 1-1.

simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain and exploit the initiative, accepting risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.”⁴ In order to meet the operational requirements in both Iraq and Afghanistan however, the Army has accepted risk and shifted the majority of its training resources to focus on stability operations. This shift in training focus has created an environment where the United States Army is now potentially greatly unprepared for conventional maneuver warfare. The United States Army must further determine if it has lost a generation of officers and NCOs that are capable of effectively training and executing high intensity operations. If the Army is not capable of effectively conducting operations along the full spectrum during the next crisis, the cost to the nation may be higher than expected. Recent operations conducted by nations allied to the United States have shown that the cost in terms of lives and military prestige may be great for failure to maintain a force that is capable of operating across the spectrum.

The purpose of this study is to determine if the United States Army should maintain its full spectrum capability while currently conducting counterinsurgency operations in two theaters. This monograph initially examines the current operational environment and threats facing the United States. It then examines national policy and Army doctrine concerning Full Spectrum Operations, the training methodology being executed at the Army’s training centers, and survey input from Command and General Staff Officer Course students concerning their issues with training for Full Spectrum Operations. The 2006 Israeli – *Hezbollah* War is utilized as a case study of what future combat may look like. It examines Israeli Defense Force preparations for combat, its execution during the war, lessons learned following this conflict, and the possible application of those lessons learned for the United States Army. Finally this monograph draws some conclusions and recommendation concerning the applicability of

⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2008), 3-1.

attempting to maintain a Full Spectrum Operations capability while viewing the world and the contemporary operational environment through the lens's of the current conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Operational Environment of the 21st Century

The end of the Cold War did not bring the “Peace Dividend” that many throughout the government thought it would bring.⁵ In 1992, noted scholar and former Deputy Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, Francis Fukuyama, published *The End of History and the Last Man*, which he claimed that liberal democracies had defeated ideologies such as fascism, monarchy and most recently with the demise of the Soviet Union, communism. He went on to note that the end of the twentieth century exposed the inherent weakness of the remaining dictatorships and authoritarian rulers around the world, and that these had begun to collapse, giving way to the only remaining stable political ideology, liberal democracy. This ideological evolution to a stable form of government, inherent in a liberal democracy, marked the “end of history” and brought on the beginning of a more stable future.⁶

The demise of the Soviet Union enabled a multitude number of new actors to emerge on the world stage and attempt to create instability throughout numerous regions around the globe. During the last decade of the 20th Century, the United States became embroiled in numerous conflicts including Desert Storm, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Each of these crises was significantly different from the previous one, resulting in a continual reexamination of the roles and missions the United States

⁵ David Segal, “The Shell Game – Clinton’s Military Spending Policy.” *Washington Monthly*, July – August 1993, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_n7-8_v25/ai_14070722/, (accessed February 1, 2010). The peace dividend is a term coined at the end of the Cold War by both President George H.W. Bush and President Bill Clinton to characterize the economic benefit of decreased military spending due to the absence of a significant threat from the former Soviet Union or other military competitor. These savings, resulting from decreased major weapons purchases and decreased numbers of soldiers within the military, could be funneled into other social programs.

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (New York: The Free Press. 1992), xi – xxiii.

military forces would play.⁷ During this decade, terrorism emerged as a significant issue confronting the United States with Osama Bin Laden's *Al Qaida* network declaring war on the United States. The peace dividend that many in the United States planned for at the beginning of the 1990s, looked significantly different after the hotel bombing in Aden, Yemen in 1992, the crisis in Somalia in 1993, leaving eighteen United States Army Rangers dead, and following the initial attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. These attacks were further followed up with attacks on the Kobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the 1998 attacks on United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole and finally the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.⁸

The instability witnessed during the final decade on the 20th century, continued into the new millennium. The first decade of the 21st Century has been highlighted by the continual conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many feel that the world has now emerged into an era of persistent conflict. Numerous trends, such as the effects of globalization, the rapid growth and spread of technology, democratic changes, rapid urbanization, increased demands for diminishing natural resources, climate change and natural disaster, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the rising number of failed or failing states around the world are fueling the sense of insecurity and unrest around the world. These trends are currently at the forefront of much military thought and planning and will likely continue to shape the security environment for the next several decades.⁹

The environment of the next decade will likely introduce a greater level of uncertainty and insecurity. Threats will likely become more varied and harder to anticipate. In John J. Mearsheimer's article, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War", he argues the security situation of the bi-polar Cold

⁷ Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan, *Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power*, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2008), 6-7.

⁸ Norman Friedman, *Terrorism, Afghanistan and America's New Way of War*, (Annapolis: Navy Institute Press, 2003), 13-17.

⁹ *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, 1-1.

War was a much more secure environment than the one now experienced around the world. The relative parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact virtually ensured peace across Europe, even though that parity was based on nuclear weapons. Now the fractured inequities of the multi-polar world are likely to invite war in the future.¹⁰ These threats will also likely be harder to combat with the military instrument of power alone and will likely spread from country to country faster than previously encountered, closely resembling a spreading virus that knows no borders. The continued emergence of non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations and organized crime syndicates, will continue to play an even larger role in regional and world affairs. Some of these emerging actors will be further supported by nation states, acting as their proxies, with access to greater resources.¹¹ As the United States develops policy and doctrine for managing the challenges of this unstable 21st century operational environment, multiple threat streams continue to emerge. Although the United States does not have a peer competitor on a global scale, it does have numerous threats from regional competitors seeking global influence. Regional powers and terrorist organizations seeking to upgrade their military capabilities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other technologies will further challenge United States hegemony around the world.

Challenges to the Operational Environment

Regional powers such as China, Russia, and North Korea continue to attempt to increase their influence by expanding and upgrading their military forces. For example, China maintains the world's largest army and is currently expanding its military budget in order to modernize its armed forces. Much of China's emphasis remains in the high technology arena including: anti-access and area denial, long

¹⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War." in *Conflict After The Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, Second Edition*, ed. Richard K. Betts, (New York: Longman Printing, 2002), 17-32.

¹¹ *Field Manual 1, The Army*, 2-2.

range strike and space and information warfare capabilities. It's surface and submarine fleets recently upgraded its weapon systems to include high-speed torpedoes capable of exceeding 200 knots and the Mach 3, SS-N-22 anti-ship cruise missile which ranges in excess of 125 miles. Both of these systems could pose a significant threat to the United States naval forces operating in the Pacific.¹²

Russia is also attempting to re-emerge on the world scene by modernizing a smaller, more advanced military establishment. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the Russian military should be reformed and equipped with modern weapons by 2020. This re-emergent Russia is also exporting billions of dollars of high tech weapons to regional powers such as Venezuela and Iran. A modern Russian military force could rekindle old tensions on the European and Asian continents as it attempts to wield this new military force to influence political and economic decisions across the globe.¹³

North Korea is another regional power that greatly adds to instability in Eastern Asia and to the global proliferation of high technology weapons. As recently as December 14, 2009, in defiance of United Nations sanctions, a cargo aircraft full of surface to air missiles and explosives was seized after it departed North Korea heading for an unknown Middle Eastern country. This seizure in Thailand is just one on a list of sanction violations for which North Korea is cited.¹⁴ Tensions throughout the region have significantly heightened due to these violations coupled with recent ballistic missile testing, on-going nuclear weapons developments and diplomatic saber rattling by North Korea.

Non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, continue to create instability around the world, often directly challenging the United States or its allies in certain regions of the world. According to a

¹² Michael W. Isherwood, "Airpower For Hybrid Warfare." Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, Mitchell Institute Press, June, 2009, http://www.afa.org/mitchell/Reports/MP3_HybridWarfare_0609.pdf, (accessed 4 NOV 2009), 5-6.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy, June 2008*, Washington, D.C. <http://www.asiaing.com/2008-national-defense-strategy.html>. (accessed September 10, 2009), 4.

¹⁴ Patrick Barta, Evan Ramstad, and Jay Solomon, "Officials Probe North Korea Arms Cache." *Wall Street Journal*, December 14, 2009, A8.

United States Department of State report, the United States currently tracks over eighty terrorist organizations. Many of these organizations have a regional base of operations and objectives such as, the *Shining Path* in Peru, *17 November* in Greece, *Hamas* in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, *Hezbollah* in Lebanon and the *Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia* (FARC), but some have a global network and a disruptive ideology such as *al Qaeda*.¹⁵ According to the United States Department of State, the countries of Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are listed as state sponsors of terrorism because of the direct aid provided to terrorist organizations. These countries provide funds, weapons, materials, training, and secure areas from which terrorist organization such as *Hezbollah* draw their capabilities and base their operations. These countries all have the technology to build weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons, which could be funneled through terrorist organizations to create further instability around the world.¹⁶ In the last several years, the web of these terrorist organizations has expanded around the world, with attacks conducted in over thirteen countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, and Morocco.¹⁷

The development of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them by numerous countries further complicates the operational environment facing the United States. Currently nine countries have nuclear weapons, with others such as Iran and Syria currently seeking such weapons.¹⁸ In

¹⁵ US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2004*, Washington, D.C., Depart of State Publication 11248, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45313.pdf>, April 2005, 92-128, (accessed November 27, 2009).

¹⁶ Ibid, 88-91.

¹⁷ White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/nss.pdf>, (accessed September 10, 2009), 9.

¹⁸ Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Globalization and the Nature of War*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 3. Currently the nine countries listed to have nuclear weapons are the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Currently Iran and Syria are attempting to develop such technology.

addition to nuclear weapons, twenty nine countries are currently armed with chemical and biological weapons. Some of these countries, such as Syria, Iran, and North Korea are currently labeled as state sponsors of terrorism, further adding tension and instability to the global operational environment that faces the United States.¹⁹

Having weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states, tyrannical regimes, and those that sponsor terrorism can greatly affect the stability in certain regions around the world. A recent study by the *Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project* estimates there are now thirty five countries armed with ballistic missiles that are capable of delivering either nuclear or chemical and biological weapons.²⁰

Weapons in the hands of such countries as Iran or Syria potentially threaten peace in the Middle East with their on-going hostile stance towards Israel and the West and could threaten oil supplies transiting through the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.

The Department of Defense is also concerned with the proliferation of technology and advanced weapon systems. Countries attempting to further challenge the United States or its allies or emerge as a regional power will likely attempt to gain and exploit advanced technologies for their own disruptive pursuits. For example, Russian and Chinese arms sales to Iran from 2002 – 2005 increased nearly 600% from the period 1998-2001. With these sales came advanced air defense systems and ballistic missile technologies which will likely be deployed to protect their nuclear development projects.²¹ Russia

¹⁹ FAS: Intelligence Resource Program, *States Possessing, Pursuing or Capable of Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction*, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd_state.htm, 2008, (accessed December 12, 2009), 1-3. According to this report, twenty nine countries have chemical and / or biological weapons. This list includes countries such as: China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, and Syria.

²⁰ Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project, *World Missile Chart – Countries Possessing Ballistic Missiles*, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm>, 2003, (accessed 12 DEC 2009), 1-12. This report lists 35 countries currently possessing ballistic missiles, the types of missiles, their range and their payload.

²¹ Richard C. Grimmett, *CRS Report to Congress, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Countries, 1998-2005*, Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Services, Library of Congress, October 23, 2006, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL696.pdf>, (accessed November 5, 2009), 62. According to this report, Iranian

continues selling advanced air defense systems such as the S-400 series systems and the SU-35 fighter aircraft to Algeria and surrounding countries. These systems potentially destabilize the region either through resulting arms races, through their use during state on state conflicts, or as a counter to United States influence in the area.²²

The employment of both kinetic and non-kinetic technologies that directly affect capabilities utilized by the United States is a grave concern. The United States government and military operates day-to-day on its interconnectivity over the internet and through the use of satellites; any interruption of these capabilities severely impedes operations. Radios operate through the use of satellites; weapons are guided by way of global positioning systems (GPS); and tactical and government communications are conducted over the internet. A recent cyber attack by North Korea, temporally disrupting certain governmental, commercial, and financial institution's computer systems in South Korea and the United States, demonstrated the vulnerabilities of these systems to outside attacks.²³ In addition to cyber attacks on the country's internet systems, government officials are also concerned about the development and proliferation of advanced missile technology exemplified by China's use of a direct-ascent, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon to destroy one of their orbiting satellites. These missiles could be used in the future

arms sales from increased from \$300 million from 1998-2002 to over \$1.7billion between 2002-2005. Also arms sales from China rose from \$0 to \$300million in the same period.

²² Sahit Muja, "Russian Arms Sales to Iran and the Arab World Concern US and Israel." *Examiner.Com*, <http://www.examiner.com/x-20010-NY-Economy-and-Politics-Examiner-y2009m10d9-R.org>, October 9, 2009, (accessed November 5, 2009), 2. The S-400 Air Defense System (SA-21 Growler) is the latest generation of Russian made air defense systems. This system is believed to have much greater capabilities than previous ones, including the ability to engage up to six targets simultaneously out to 400km. This system may also have the capability to counter current stealth technology.

²³ Siobhan Gorman and Evan Ramstad, "Cyber Blitz Hits U.S., Korea." *WSJ.com*, July 9, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12470180617609691.html>, First Accessed December 28, 2009, 1-2. This article outlines the cyber attack against U.S. government websites that included the Defense Department, National Security Agency, Treasury Department, Secret Service, State Department, Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal Aviation Administration. These attacks were most likely from North Korean agents and were conducted in conjunction with a North Korean missile test and a United Nations' decision to impose additional sanctions on North Korea.

against the United States or its allies to limit or degrade the capacity of its growing internet and satellite dependence during a future crisis.²⁴

Training Quandary for the United States Army

Facing these myriad threats is a force structure designed two decades ago. Following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1990, the United States Army started a force reduction that reduced the overall size of the Army from 18 divisions to 10 divisions, attempting to capitalize on the post Cold War “Peace Dividend.” With a greatly reduced force, however, the nation saw no decrease in its global commitments. The nation involved the Army in numerous operations throughout the 1990s. These military operations included numerous peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, counter-drug, fire-fighting and civil disturbances operations. The lack of a warfighting focus and training on mission-essential tasks during this period worried Army leadership, specifically then-Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, who promised “No more Task Force Smiths,” referring to the lead elements that entered the Korean War untrained and poorly-equipped for the type of combat they faced. He vowed that Army forces at the end of the 20th Century would not be unprepared for the future because of a focus on missions other than war.²⁵

Core competencies for 21st century warfare are neither conventionally-focused nor counterinsurgency-focused, nor asymmetric in nature, but rather include the whole spectrum, evolving and emerging depending on the situation and crisis. General Sullivan’s concerns in the last decade of the 20th Century hold true at the end of the first decade of the 21st Century: If the United States Army

²⁴ Leonard David, “Pentagon Report: China’s Growing Military Space Power.” *SPACE.com*, March 6, 2008, <http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/080305-china-2008-report.html>, (accessed: December 28, 2009), 1-2.

²⁵ Donnelly and Kagan, *Ground Truth*, 13.

optimizes for operations at one end of the spectrum, it significantly increases the risk of being unprepared for operations along the entire breath of the spectrum.

According to *FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training*, Army forces at the division, brigade, and battalion levels are organized as combined arms organizations in order to generate combat power that enables the commander to accomplish a wide array of missions. The enduring capabilities and effective integration of all Warfighting Functions (intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability, combat service support, and command and control) provide the commander on the ground the flexibility and agility to adapt to the changing situation and successfully accomplish the unit's mission.²⁶ After more than eight years of continual combat in two theaters, concerns have arisen that some warfighting capabilities have been allowed to atrophy in lieu of preparing units to meet current mission requirements in either Iraq or Afghanistan. This dilemma leaves the combined arms team of the future without critical enablers. For example, the Field Artillery branch was singled out specifically in a White Paper published by three former brigade commanders because of the tension pulling in multiple directions. Field Artillery units are constantly attempting to balance training on METL tasks versus training against a directed mission to support a future deployment. These directed missions may include a variety of "COIN-centric" operations and non-standard missions such as police and army trainers, provincial reconstruction team support, and serving as military policemen in prisons. This tension has left many artillery units untrained and ill-equipped to accomplish their METL task of providing fast and accurate fire support for the maneuver commanders.²⁷

²⁶ U.S Department of the Army, *Field Manual 7-1, Battle Focused Training*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 15, 2003), 3-3 – 3-6.

²⁷ COL Sean MacFarland, COL Michael Shields, and COL Jeffery Snow, "White Paper – The King and I: The impending Crisis in Field Artillery's Ability to Provide Fire Support to the Maneuver Commanders." May, 2008, <http://www.npr.org/documents/2008/may/artillerywhitepaper.pdf>, (accessed September 27, 2009), 1-3.

FM 7-0, Training For Full Spectrum Operations acknowledges the dilemma with which commanders are faced, trying to balance limited resources against varying requirements. The Department of the Army established core mission-essential tasks (CMETL) for each echelon above battalion in order to standardized tasks based on the unit type. A unit's CMETL is defined as a list of a unit's core capability mission-essential tasks and general mission-essential tasks. For example a notional CMETL for a Brigade Combat Team may include the following: conduct offensive operations, conduct defensive operations, conduct stability operations, conduct security operations, integrate information engagement capabilities, conduct command and control, protect the force and provide sustainment.²⁸ According to *FM 7-0*, in contrast to a unit's CMETL, a unit may develop a directed mission-essential task list (DMETL) to support a directed mission.²⁹

In an effort to meet the high demands of the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has adjusted its tiered readiness and sequential deployment approach with a rotational model. The Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) guides Army brigades (Active and National Guard) through this model where brigades rotate through three pools: available to deploy, reset, and train and ready. During the "available to deploy" phase, brigades deploy for a 12-15 month tour to theater. Following deployment, brigades enter the "reset" phase of ARFORGEN resulting in the resetting of personnel and equipment. This includes a high turn-over of personnel and leadership, schooling and the reequipping of the unit with its authorized equipment. Upon completion of this phase, the brigade enters the "train / ready" portion of ARFORGEN where the unit conducts collective training in preparation for its next deployment cycle. This progressive readiness model identifies that some units are deployed and fully trained, others are just entering the training cycle and not fully trained for their mission, while the

²⁸ *Field Manual 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, 4-6 – 4-9.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 4-10.

remaining units have recently returned from a deployment and are resetting personnel and equipment and are not prepared for immediate deployment.³⁰

The limited time, available to units during the “reset” and “train / ready” phases of ARFORGEN, demands that units prioritize all collective and individual training in order to meet mission requirements. The establishment of training priorities is a critical issue facing commanders who are challenged to reset their unit in a short period of time, conduct all required training, and prepare their unit for its next deployment. The high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) units are faced with during this era of persistent conflict and repetitive deployment cycles causes units to pick and choose between tasks on their CMETL and their DMETL lists. These directed tasks relate specifically to their perceived next mission in theater, such as training police forces or escorting provincial reconstruction teams, as opposed to their CMETL tasks that might include conducting offensive and defensive operations.³¹

United States Army doctrine states that a unit develops their METL tasks from a variety of sources: wartime operational plans, enduring combat capabilities, the operational environment, directed missions, and external guidance.³² Utilizing *FM 7-15, The Army Universal Task List*, commanders may develop their DMETL during their “Train / Ready” phase of the ARFORGEN cycle to support their next mission. The following list provides a small sample listing of tasks available to commanders as they develop a DMETL to prepare for their next mission:

ART 7.3.4	Support Governance
ART 4.4.1	Perform Detainee Operations
ART 5.4	Conduct Civil Military Operations
ART 7.3.1.3	Conduct Border Control, Boundary Security, and Freedom of Movement

³⁰ General Charles C. Campbell, “ARFORGEN: Maturing the Model, Refining the Process.” *Army*, June 2009, 50

³¹ Major Erick Sweet, *The True Meaning of Balance: The Leadership Challenge of Executing Full Spectrum Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 2009), 6.

³² *Field Manual 7-1, Battle Focused Training*, 3-3.

Commanders choosing to focus on these tasks minimize resources available for training on their CMETL tasks, thus potentially reducing their training readiness as described in *AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting*.³⁴

FM 3-0, Operations outlines the Spectrum of Conflict and related Operational Themes, in which military forces are expected to operate, escalating from a stable peace environment, through unstable peace and insurgency, and culminating in general war. The dilemma facing commanders with units pending deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan is where to focus their limited training resources.³⁵ Commanders often attempt to balance both requirements: matching the immediate need of preparing the unit for the next deployment against the need to maintain an overall operational readiness that enables the unit to operate across the full spectrum. Strategic guidance and Army doctrine all clearly state that the Army needs to retain its flexibility to operate across the full spectrum, even when confronted with the current operational requirements in multiple theaters.

³³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 7-15, The Army Universal Task List*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, 2006), i-viii. This manual provides units with a list of tasks used to develop a METL or to develop a specific listing of possible directed missions. The final task: Train Host Nation Police and Army Forces is not specifically stated as a task in FM 7-15, but is often one that is derived by commanders based on their mission analysis of their future mission and one that is often executed in theater.

³⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, December 19, 2006), 63. AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting states that commanders utilize Core METL until a unit receives its deployment orders to report their training status. Upon receipt of deployment orders, commanders may use a set of directed mission tasks to determine training status. Training readiness is based on a combination of T-METL assessment, using a trained, proficient, untrained (T, P, U) model, in conjunction with a T-Days assessment which measures the number of days required to be fully trained on all tasks.

³⁵ *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, 2-1 – 2-5.

Landpower: Present Requirements versus Future Capability

The categories of warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes. One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction – from the sophisticated to the simple – being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.

Robert M. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense³⁶

Understanding the future operational environment and defining the requirements needed to effectively operate within that environment has continually challenged the United States military. Even with operations in the Balkans, Haiti, and Somalia occupying much of military's focus in the 1990s, the Department of Defense instead chose to minimize risk to some aspects of operational success by focusing on fighting the next conventional military threat. This focused preparation for a peer competitor during the Cold War served the military well during the initial Gulf War in 1991 and again during the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. It, however, faltered once the conflicts transitioned into counterinsurgency operations. Lacking the doctrine to meet these emerging threats in theater, the Army quickly set out to update its capstone doctrine, *FM 3-0 Operations* in 2001 and again in 2008. *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, published in 2006, provides a framework for these and future counterinsurgency operations.³⁷ The Army's training model also needed to adjust for the new environment. A military force trained solely for offensive and defensive operations does not equal a force that is capable of conducting effective stability operations. Also, forces that have been extensively trained for years to conduct counterinsurgency operations require extensive training to regain proficiency

³⁶ Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, *Foreign Affairs*, (January – February 2009), 33.

³⁷ Thomas D. MacDonald, *Preparing Leaders for Full-Spectrum Operations*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 21, 2008), 1-3. *FM 3-0, Operations*, updated in 2008, outlines the need to ensure the military is prepared to engage a wide variety of foes in a period of persistent conflict. This manual focuses on maintaining a Full Spectrum capability to ensure the Army is capable of achieving decisive results in any theater. *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, published in DEC 2006, in conjunction with the United States Marine Corps, outlines the strategy and operations currently being employed in both Iraq and Afghanistan to counter the insurgent threats.

in their CMETL tasks.³⁸ The risk facing the Army is placing too many training resources against one portion of the spectrum of conflict, leaving other portions uncovered.

In 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates outlined his strategy for balancing risk. According to Secretary of Defense Gates, the United States must not only prevail and win decisively in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan but also must prepare for future unforeseen contingencies. The United States must also embrace counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance operations, while maintaining its existing conventional and strategic edge against other military threats.³⁹ Army forces of the 21st Century are supposed to embody the aspects of versatility and agility and maintain an expeditionary capability in order to meet the requirements imposed by the national leadership. Even though the Army has met the numerous challenges imposed on it during the last eight years of conflict, the Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey is currently concerned that the Army is out of balance and lacks the strategic flexibility because of current operational demands.⁴⁰

In order to gain the perspective of mid-grade officers, who have been on the front lines in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past eight years, a survey was conducted among majors (active, reserve, and national guard) at the United States Army Command and General Staff Officers Course at Fort Leavenworth concerning the training challenges within this complex operational environment. The purpose of this survey was to identify training issues and shortcomings that rotational units were experiencing and their perception on the current and future operational environment. The second purpose

³⁸ *Field Manual 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, 1-5.

³⁹ Robert M. Gates, "A Balancing Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," 28-29.

⁴⁰ George W. Casey Jr., "America's Army in an Era of Persistent Conflict", *Army*, (OCT 2008), 19-21.

of this survey was to see if mid-grade officers saw the training challenges and the operational environment in a similar fashion to how Army's senior leadership saw the problem.⁴¹

The majority of Majors responding to the survey, 18.75% - strongly agree and 59.38% agree that asymmetric threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction were the most likely threats facing the country and 75% of the respondents did not consider it likely the country would face a conventional threat in the next five years. Even with this perception of the threats facing the country, the overwhelming majority of Majors, 46.88% - strongly agree and 50.00% - agree that maintaining a flexible force that is capable of operating along the full spectrum of operations is critical in this operational environment. Finally the vast majority of the respondents acknowledged that while assigned to their last operational units, most of the training conducted was not for their CMETL, but rather against directed missions units would conduct during their next deployment.⁴² This lack of training on CMETL tasks mirrors the concerns outlined by General Casey concerning an Army that is out of balance and not postured for operations covering the entire breath of potential conflicts.

Strategic Guidance

The challenge the United States military faces during this dynamic era of greater instability, an increasing number of unpredictable world actors, and global trends that seek to further destabilize the operational environment is building a campaign quality military that is capable of achieving success in

⁴¹ Command and General Staff Officer's Course Survey, "An Army to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century." US Army Command and General Staff College Quality Assistance Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The survey was conducted under the supervision and guidance of Maria L. Clark, Instructional Systems Specialist / Program Evaluator, CGSC Quality Assurance Office, Maria.Clark1@conus.army.mil, (913) 758-3544. This survey was administered via email to 149 CGSC students with 32 responding to the survey. This survey was conducted using a 5-point Likert Scale and the responses were recorded at the Quality Assurance Office in an anonymous manner. The survey results are attached in the Appendix to this monograph.

⁴² Ibid., Survey Questions 2, 3, 4, and 20.

this or any protracted war. *US Code, Title X* states that Congress is to provide for an Army this is capable, in conjunction with other armed forces of:

- Preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the United States, the Commonwealths, and possessions, and any area occupied by the United States.
- Supporting national policies
- Implementing the national objectives, and
- Overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.⁴³

The wide array of the threats facing the United States in 2010 prevents it from utilizing a Cold War, threat-based model to determine force structure, when the country's primary threat was the Warsaw Pact alliance. The "one size fits all" model is no longer applicable; deterrence will come in multiple sizes and with multiple capabilities.⁴⁴ Based on the threats and the general tasks outlined in *Title X*, the country needs a force that is capable of operating with ease along the full spectrum of conflict, capable of conducting combat and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, to conducting nation building operations in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti as part of JTF- Horn of Africa, to conducting humanitarian relief operations in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami or the 2005 Pakistani earthquake.⁴⁵ The nation's objectives and policies may vary greatly; having a multidimensional force is critical to achieving those aims.

The *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (QDR) further reinforces the point that the United States needs a force that is capable of defeating any foe, in any theater, to achieve the nation's objectives. This QDR stated "America's interests and role in the world require armed forces with unmatched capabilities and a willingness on the part of the nation to employ them in defense of our interests and the

⁴³ U.S. Code, Title X – Armed Forces, Sub-title B – Army, Part I – Organization, Chapter 307 – The Army, Section 3062 – "Policy; composition, organization peace establishment," Sub-paragraph (a); http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_00003062----000_.html. (accessed November 18, 2009).

⁴⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2006, Washington, D.C. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/qdr-2006-report.htm>. (accessed September 12, 2009). 4.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 10-13.

common good.”⁴⁶ The maintenance of a full spectrum capable force enables the Department of Defense to further manage resources and risk within the four priority objectives as outlined in the latest QDR, which are: prevailing in the current wars, preventing and deterring conflict, preparing to defeat adversaries in a wide array of contingencies and preserving the All-Volunteer Force.⁴⁷

Similar to the Cold War, the United States is now faced with a new fanatical threat, one that is now based on the “perversion of a proud religion.”⁴⁸ *The National Security Strategy of 2006* outlines several essential tasks that must be achieved if the country is to meet the new threats head-on and defeat them. Although most of the tasks outlined required multiple elements of national power to support them, the military line of operation plays a significant role in the following tasks: strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism, work with neighbors to defuse regional conflicts, prevent enemies from threatening us or allies, and transforming America’s national security institutions.⁴⁹ The latest *National Security Strategy* further states “We are pursuing a future force that will provide tailored deterrence of both state and non-state threats (including WMD employment, terrorist attacks in the physical and information domains, and opportunistic aggression) while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors.”⁵⁰

Leveraging all elements of national power is critical to the overall success on the required missions as outlined in the *National Security Strategy*. Deterrence requires a force that is capable of operating along the entire spectrum of conflict, in a diverse array of potential future scenarios, similar to

⁴⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 1, 2010, Washington, D.C.: <http://www.defense.gov/QDR>. (accessed February 1, 2010). iv.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 11-16.

⁴⁸ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006*, 1.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 1.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 43.

those listed above. “Both offenses and defenses are necessary to deter state and non-state actors, through denial of the objectives of their attack and, if necessary, responding with overwhelming force.”⁵¹

The *2008 National Defense Strategy* and the most recent *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* published in February 2010 identifies a number of risk factors that must be carefully managed if the country is going to prevail in the current conflicts and future crises that arise. Most notably, the Department of Defense must closely manage Future Challenge Risks that test the capacity of the United States military to execute future missions against an array of prospective challengers and Force Management Risks that challenge the ability of the United States military to meet recruiting, retaining, training, and equipping objectives.⁵² With an understanding of the wide array of threats facing the country and the risks that have to be managed, the Department of Defense has stated that its military capabilities must not only hedge against unforeseen crises, but also must retain the agility and flexibility to respond rapidly to emerging crises and operate effectively alongside partners from other nations, governmental agencies, and non-governmental organizations. The Department of Defense has developed objectives to support the broader policies outlined in the *National Security Strategy*, which include: defending the homeland, winning the long war, promoting security, deterring conflict, and winning our nation’s wars.⁵³ All of these objectives and goals outlined in both of these strategies demonstrate the need for a military force that is not optimized for a single portion of the conflict spectrum, but one that can easily move along the spectrum, depending on the crisis and threat, to rapidly and effectively accomplish the mission. *Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05*, dated September 16, 2009 reinforces the need for a full spectrum force by requiring the United States military to treat stability operations as a core

⁵¹ Ibid., 22.

⁵² *National Defense Strategy*, 89-95.

⁵³ Ibid., 5-6.

mission. This guidance requires military forces to train for and be able to conduct and support stability during all phases on an operation.⁵⁴

The Joint Vision of Future Warfighting outlined in the *2004 National Military Strategy* ensures the joint forces of the United States are capable of full spectrum dominance and are able to control any crisis and defeat any adversary regardless of the environment or where it falls on the spectrum of conflict.⁵⁵ Building a force that is capable of full spectrum dominance requires it to retain strategic agility, the ability to act decisive, and the ability to effectively integrate all elements of national power into the effort. The Joint Operational Concepts outlined in the *National Military Strategy* include both Stability Operations and Major Combat Operations, along with Homeland Security and Strategic Deterrence.⁵⁶ The examination of these national security documents once again points out that the military, and specifically the Army which provides the majority of the land power to the joint force, cannot be optimized for the current fight without regard as to how current needs may impact the future requirements and expectations.

As outlined in the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, with the development of a 21st Century Total Force, the country will always seek to “overmatch” adversaries in any conflict, by maximizing all capabilities within the government and military.⁵⁷ Within the military, that means a force that is capable of full spectrum dominance and one that is capable of operating with agility and decisiveness in any theater.

⁵⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *DoD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations*, (Washington, D.C. September 16, 2009), <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>, (accessed March 22, 2010), 2.

⁵⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow, 2004*, (Washington, D.C., 2004), <http://www.asiaing.com/2008-national-defense-strategy.html>, (accessed September 10, 2009), viii.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 7-9.

⁵⁷ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2006, 75.

Training During an Era of Persistent Conflict

Army doctrine for many years has continued to reinforce the concept for all Army organizations, from squad and crew level through battalion, brigade and division to “train the way we fight.” The realism and intensity that units put forth during training will bear fruit and potentially save lives during combat.⁵⁸ Due to the high operational tempo facing the Army, coupled with the limitations placed on units as they rotate through the ARFORGEN cycle, training for missions along the higher end of the spectrum has been minimized even though the Army’s operational concept calls for a full spectrum capability.⁵⁹ The maintenance of this capability is critical to the execution of the ongoing counterinsurgency operations.

A further examination of the Army’s latest counterinsurgency doctrine in *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* calls for a force that is capable of conducting a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations to support the mission on the ground. Commanders are supposed to proportion effectively the amount of effort to each of the three key missions based on the situation on the ground and the echelon of command.⁶⁰ Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, the commanders on the ground have witnessed the pendulum swing rapidly from one end of the spectrum to the other based on the changing threats and conditions in their particular area of operation. For example, even after the Army recognized that a counterinsurgency fight was under way, units still conducted offensive operations requiring armored vehicles, artillery, and close air support. The Second Battle of Fallujah in November – December 2004 is a prime example of the need to maintain a high end capability even while engaged in a counterinsurgency fight. This operation involved armored and mechanized forces from Marine

⁵⁸ *Field Manual 7-1: Battle Focused Training*, 1-2.

⁵⁹ *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, 2-1 – 2-5.

⁶⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, December 15, 2006), 1-19.

Regimental Combat Teams 1 and 7, the Army's 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, and 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division supporting in nearby Ramadi. The nearly two-month fight required the use of artillery, armored, mechanized and light infantry forces in a very high intensive fight throughout the city of Fallujah.⁶¹ Conducting of counterinsurgency operations, similar to conducting major combat operations, requires flexible and agile forces capable of executing multiple tasks to support the larger mission.

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency outlines multiple principles for the successful execution of counterinsurgency operations. Among those directly relating to the Army's Full Spectrum Operational Concept are: insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support, security under the rule of law is essential, and counterinsurgents should be prepared for a long term commitment. All of these principles call for varying amounts of offensive, defensive, stability effort, at varying times depending on the situation and the location of the unit.⁶² Maintaining an agile force that can conduct a wide array of tasks, both CMETL and DMETL tasks, provides the commander the greatest amount of flexibility.

A further examination of the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine calls for the development of logical lines of operation to guide the development of a campaign plan while conducting counterinsurgency operations. These logical lines of operation can include: conducting combat and civil security operations, developing host nation security forces, reestablishing essential services, supporting economical development, and conducting information operations.⁶³ The combination of a unit's CMETL tasks such as conducting offensive and defensive and selected DMETL tasks such as training host nation security forces and supporting governance are critical to enabling a unit to effectively operate along all

⁶¹ Dr. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese. *On Point II - Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 – January 2005*. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute Press, June 2008), 344-359.

⁶² *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, 1-20 – 1-22.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 5-1 – 5-17.

lines of operation. For example, key tasks along the “Conduct Combat and Civil Security Operations” logical line of operation may include a wide array of offensive and defensive tasks beyond those stability tasks a unit may already be conducting. These may include securing the population, separating the insurgency from the people, isolating the insurgency, securing national and regional borders, and integrating with host nation forces. *FM 3-24* calls for forces that can easily operate under multiple conditions, and rapidly transition from one type of task to another depending on the conditions on the ground.⁶⁴

The Department of the Army is not only looking for organizations that are agile and flexible, but it also requires that leaders be adaptable. Adaptive leaders require a coherent understanding of the interwoven concepts of the full spectrum operational concept and the uncertainty encountered in counterinsurgency operations. According to *FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training*, the building of adaptive leaders is a process that starts with an understanding of doctrine and the experience gained during intensive training. With those initial steps comes the competence to make decisions based on the experiences learned during training and the confidence in the unit and equipment. After completing collective training, leaders emerge with the initiative to make decisions based on prior knowledge and experience.⁶⁵

Attempting to build agile and flexible units and adaptable leaders, both the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center have adapted training models that prepare units for their upcoming deployments to either Iraq or Afghanistan. The National Training Center specifically states its mission as providing “tough, realistic, joint and combined arms training” focused at the battalion and

⁶⁴ Ibid., 5-3 – 5-5.

⁶⁵ *Field Manual 7-1 Battle Focused Training*, 4-30 – 4-32.

brigade levels.⁶⁶ Brigadier General Robert W. Cone, the former commander of the National Training Center states that although units rotate through the training center usually one to six months from their deployment date to theater, they are offered a range of training scenarios to assist training them on their predeployment training requirements. Some of the scenarios also contain elements from the full spectrum menu, including a high intensity portion, then a transition to stability operations for their mission rehearsal exercise.⁶⁷ The Joint Readiness Training Center's purpose is very similar with the additional statement of training leaders to operate within complex situations, while also creating flexible units and skilled soldiers that are capable of operating across the full spectrum.⁶⁸ Both of these mission statements state the focus as one providing a full spectrum capability. Yet, even with this emphasis on developing leaders and units to be able to effectively navigate the myriad of missions facing them in theater, many units still have seen the individual and collective tasks that support CMETL tasks erode.

Effective training is the fundamental building block for tactical and operational success. Unfortunately, there are a number of examples of institutions and organizations failing to train for full spectrum operations, potentially leaving vital elements of the combined arms team on the sidelines during the next fight. Major General Donald Campbell, Commanding General of the United States Armor Center, is recently quoted in an article outlining his concerns that traditional military functions are eroding as a result of the "overemphasis" on the current counterinsurgency fight at the expense of traditional tasks that support offensive and defensive missions. He goes on to state that the high operational tempo within many units has greatly reduced the opportunities for tank crews to train and conduct gunnery qualification to standard and other competencies such as conducting vehicle

⁶⁶ Mission Statement from the National Training Center Homepage, http://www.irwin.army.mil/cmd_staff/NTCcommunitypages/default.aspx. (accessed December 30, 2009).

⁶⁷ Robert W. Cone. "The Changing National Training Center." *Military Review*, (May – June 2006). 73.

⁶⁸ Mission Statement from the Joint Readiness Training Center Homepage, <http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/OPS/INDEX.HTM>. (accessed November 3, 2009).

maintenance and services have also greatly diminished.⁶⁹ Training individual and collective tasks that support a unit's CMETL is critical to the long term development of the young sergeants and lieutenants who will lead tomorrow's units during future contingencies.

Artillery core competencies have also been significantly eroded over the course of the past eight years. Three former brigade commanders highlight recent National Training Center trends that indicate significant problems for the "King of Battle." Routine tasks are no longer routine for many artillery units. Fires nets are no longer maintained and fires annexes with operation orders are seldom produced. Over 90% of fire supporters in artillery units are serving outside their assigned military occupation specialty (MOS), leaving the vast majority of them uncertified in their position. During the majority of rotations at the National Training Centers, controllers observe numerous unsafe acts. This overall lack of training prevents units from the effective planning and execution of fire support plans and leaves maneuver commanders without the support they may require during a particular mission.⁷⁰

A further examination of the survey conducted within the Command and General Staff Officer Course reveals that maintaining core competencies is also of high importance to the midgrade officers that are charged with conducting daily combat operations within Iraq and Afghanistan. Offensive tasks remain relevant in the current operational environment according to 78.13% of the Majors (25% - strongly agree and 53.13% - agree). The vast majority of Majors, 85.18% (28.93% - strongly agree and 56.25% - agree) concur that the Army's ability to maintain proficiency in core offensive and defensive tasks is critical to its ability to react to future contingencies.⁷¹ The erosion of individual and collective tasks that support a unit's CMETL may limit a future force from effectively conducting operations along

⁶⁹ Spencer Ackerman, "How Much Counterinsurgency Training." *The Washington Independent*. November 11, 2008. <http://washingtonindependent.com/17598/a-lesson-in-counterinsurgency>, (accessed November 7, 2009), 2.

⁷⁰ MacFarland, Shields, and Snow. "White Paper – The King and I." 1-4.

⁷¹ CGSC Survey, Survey Questions 6 and 11.

full spectrum of conflict, greatly increasing the risk for the Soldier on the ground and the overall success of the mission.

The risk faced by the Soldier and to the mission is based on both the allocation of resources needed to prepare for the contingency and defining of the threats. Developing the wrong conclusions about what the future holds can be problematic, especially to a military that has enjoyed success in the past. During numerous periods in the nation's history, the United States Army has struggled with trying to match future threats and capabilities. The United States is not alone in these struggles; allies such as Israel have also been challenged to define the future force and the operational and tactical concepts needed to support the current operational environment. Following their decisive victory in the 1967 Six Day War with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan a prevalent feeling overcame most in the Israeli military and government; a perception of invulnerability that almost led to disaster six years later in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.⁷² Thirty-three years later in 2006, Israel again emerged from one operational environment, a peacekeeping operation and entered a completely different operational environment, one that closely resembled major combat operations. Following the six year conflict of the Second Intifada, which raged throughout the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and on the streets of Israel, the Israeli Defense Forces were left with a poorly-trained and equipped force that was incapable of operating at the higher end of the spectrum. At the outset of the July 2006 Hezbollah Conflict, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were ill-prepared for the hybrid conflict that ensued for thirty-four days. The resulting miscalculations left the Israeli Defense Forces badly shaken and Israeli military prestige around the world severely damaged.⁷³

⁷² George W. Gawrych. *The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and Policy Between Egypt and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars*. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000), 257.

⁷³ Matt M. Matthews. *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah – Israeli War*. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 22 and 63.

Case Study: 2006 Israeli – Hezbollah War

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

Carl von Clausewitz
On War – Chapter 1⁷⁴

Israeli – Arab conflicts have been an ongoing issue since the creation of the State of Israel in 1947, with conflicts raging in 1948-1949, 1956-1957, 1967, 1973, 1978, and a 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Operation Peace For Galilee. For eighteen years, the IDF conducted operations in Lebanon in order to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) militants and prevent further attacks on Israel from the occupied territories. Finally in 2000, Israel withdrew its forces in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1559 that stated that the country of Lebanon was to secure the area with military forces, preventing militants from returning and rearming. Unfortunately for Israel that did not happen.⁷⁵ Further fueling the seeds of discontent in Lebanon during the eighteen years of occupation were numerous negative events such as the massacre of Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatila. These incidents portrayed Israeli operations in a negative light and gave rise to the creation of organizations such as *Hezbollah* to combat the IDF.⁷⁶

With the termination of operations in Lebanon in 2000, Israel hoped to put an end to the seemingly endless guerilla war in which it was embroiled. However, the conflict quickly spilled over to Gaza and the West Bank, becoming known as the Second Intifada or Al-Aqsa Intifada. The visit by Ariel

⁷⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.

⁷⁵ Robert L. Dilworth and Shlomo Maital. *Fogs of War and Peace: A Midstream Analysis of World War III*. (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International. 2008), 139.

⁷⁶ Gilbert Achcar and Michel Warschawski. *The 33-Day War: Israel's War on Hezbollah in Lebanon and its Consequences*. (Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 4-5.

Sharon, Israeli Opposition Leader and future Prime Minister, to Temple Mount, also known as Haram al-Sharif, following the failure of the Camp David Peace Summit in July 2000 is believed to be the spark that ignited these hostilities. For the better part of the next six years, conflict raged in Israel, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Palestinian forces conducted a number of large suicide bombings throughout Israel starting with the June 1, 2001 attack in Tel Aviv that killed twenty-one and wounded over sixty and included follow-on attacks in Jerusalem in August 2001, Haifa in December 2001, Netanya in March 2002, Rishon Letzion in May 2002, Jerusalem in June 2002, Tel Aviv in January 2003, and Jerusalem again in June and August 2003. Similar attacks continued for nearly two more years. Israel quickly responded to the numerous attacks by striking targets in Gaza and the West Bank including the killing of key Palestinian and *Hamas* leaders. These included the People's Liberation Front leader Abu Ali Mustafa on August 27, 2000, *Hamas* Commander Salah Shedada on July 22, 2002, *Hamas* Spiritual Leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin on March 22, 2004, and *Hamas* Leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi on May 17, 2004. Israel also conducted a number of military operations aimed at limiting the capabilities of the PLO and *Hamas* from continuing their terrorist type operations.⁷⁷

With tensions continuing to escalate into 2006, *Hamas* conducted a raid from Gaza on June 25th and captured an Israeli soldier, whom they hoped could be exchanged for detained Palestinians. Israel quickly responded with the launching of an offensive, code-named "Summer Rains" into Gaza on June 28th, hoping to deal a heavy blow to the *Hamas* organization.⁷⁸ The *Hamas* raid was quickly followed up by a similar type operation conducted by *Hezbollah* from Lebanon. On July 12th, a squad within a Reserve Battalion of the 300th Brigade, 91st Division was completing a mission along the border with Lebanon when their two vehicle patrol came under attack, killing three soldiers and wounding four others.

⁷⁷ BBC News. *Al-Aqsa Intifada Timeline*, 29 September 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3677206.stm. (accessed 19 January 2010). 1-5.

⁷⁸ Achcar and Warschawski. *The 33-Day War*, 15.

A team of approximately twenty *Hezbollah* fighters quickly pulled two of the wounded from the burning vehicles and returned to Southern Lebanon before IDF forces could respond. The capture of these two soldiers and the rapid Israeli response was the final spark that initiated the 2006 War.⁷⁹

Preparations for War

The capture of the IDF soldiers may have been the spark that ignited the conflict, but after many years of conflict between Israel and its neighbors, war seemed almost inevitable as tensions flared on both sides of the border. Foreseeing such a conflict with Israel, *Hezbollah* preparations for war began immediately after the 2000 withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon and by 2006 they were well prepared for a fight. *Hezbollah* Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah stated in a May 2006 speech that “Israeli society is weak” and was determined to take the next fight well into Israel and tax the social network of the Israeli people. From 2000 – 2006, *Hezbollah* amassed a rocket force that consisted of between 12,000 and 13,000 short, medium, and long range surface-to-surface missiles. In order to protect these assets and the forces charged with firing them from the overwhelming Israeli precision fires, *Hezbollah* scattered these missiles with teams across Southern Lebanon, hiding them in both rural and urban areas.⁸⁰

Time was not wasted on the preparation of ground forces either. During this six-year period, many of *Hezbollah*’s approximately 1000 full-time fighters received advanced training in Iran and Syria. These forces were further supported by an undetermined number of local militia.⁸¹ *Hezbollah* forces were equipped with modern anti-tank weapons that included AT-14s, AT-5s, Sagger AT-3s, Fagot AT-4s, Milan anti-tank missiles, American-made TOWs, RPG-29s, and RPG-7s. In addition to the large array of

⁷⁹ Matthews. *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 33-36.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 16-17.

⁸¹ Donnelly and Kagan. *Ground Truth*, 68.

anti-tank weapons, these forces were also trained in the use of mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mortars. This lethal combination of munitions was effectively integrated into combined arms, anti-tank ambushes throughout the conflict that would ensue in the summer of 2006.⁸²

In addition to developing combat units, *Hezbollah* also invested heavily in counter-signal intelligence (C-SIGNET) and human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. Both these capabilities produced significant returns during the conflict, with their HUMINT capabilities producing significant returns prior to the conflict with the identification and turning of Israeli agents in Southern Lebanon and the overall dismantling of another major spy network prior to the start of the conflict.⁸³ Finally, the physical preparation of the future battlefield began with *Hezbollah's* understanding and appreciation of Israeli precision weapons capabilities. From 2000 – 2006, *Hezbollah* engineers constructed over 600 command and weapons storage bunkers throughout Southern Lebanon in order to provide forward forces easy access to protected storage facilities. Many of these facilities were dug over 40 meters into the cliffs and many were disguised due to the numerous decoy bunkers that were simultaneously built to fool the ever-watching Israeli drones flying overhead.⁸⁴

In summary, the enemy forces facing Israel in the summer of 2006 were significantly different than those previously encountered fighting the Palestinians in Gaza or the West Bank. These hardened forces had just two goals during this conflict: bleed the IDF forces as much as possible while inflicting casualties on the Israeli population through the continual rocket barrages and, as the *Hezbollah* Leader Nasrallah stated, survive. Victory could be theirs if they survived the impending Israeli onslaught.⁸⁵

⁸² Matthews. *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 18-19.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁸⁵ Donnelly and Kagan. *Ground Truth*, 66-68.

Israeli goals and objectives of the conflict were much broader and by all accounts much harder to achieve. Their primary goal was to destroy *Hezbollah*, which would be accomplished through three primary tactics. First, Israel would launch a massive air campaign and rely on the precision strike capabilities to destroy weapons depots, cut off supplies, kill large numbers of *Hezbollah* fighters, and “decapitate” the leadership of the organization, to include killing Hassan Nasrallah. The second tactic used in this campaign would be to attempt to turn the Lebanese people against *Hezbollah* through the use of leaflet drops and other psychological operations, all attempting to demonstrate that *Hezbollah* was behind their suffering. The third tactic of their initial plan was to significantly disrupt the lives of the Lebanese people through the use of blockades, inciting the people to rise up against *Hezbollah* and then pushing the Lebanese Army to secure the area against the militants.⁸⁶ The Israeli strategy for achieving their goals differed significantly from that of their enemy. Their initial plan relied heavily on their asymmetric advantage of precision strike weapons and not on the employment of their ground forces.

In the summer of 2006, the Israeli General Staff believed that the supremacy of air power would be the guiding force in all future conflicts. Since Desert Storm in 1991, there had been a tremendous focus on the development of air power and precision strike capabilities, leaving many to believe that a future war in Lebanon would be nothing more than an updated version of the 1999 aerial operation in Kosovo. Many were seeking ways to produce quick conclusions to future conflicts, resulting in the need for small ground forces. Air power was the panacea for which many were seeking.⁸⁷ The United States demonstrated precision strike capabilities during 2001 - 2002 operations in Afghanistan and during its rapid attack to Baghdad in 2003 and resulting victory over Iraqi ground forces further reinforced this

⁸⁶ Achcar and Warschawski. *The 33-Day War*, 37-39.

⁸⁷ Sarah E. Kreps, “The 2006 Lebanon War Lessons Learned.” *Parameters*, (Spring 2007), 78, and Achcar and Warschawski, *The 33-Day War*, 68.

belief in airpower's leading role in future conflicts.⁸⁸ This reliance on air power fit neatly into emerging concepts such as Effects-Based Operations and Network-Centric Warfare.⁸⁹ These theories supported the concept that the enemy could be destroyed or rendered neutral, not by attacking his front line forces, but rather by attacking his networks and key nodes in rear areas such as command and control, logistics, transportation, and radar nodes thus rendering the fighting forces incapable of further military action. Precision strike capabilities were the key ingredient to make this concept of warfare valid, not large ground forces.⁹⁰

To compliment these new emerging concepts, the Israeli Defense Force leadership began a significant review of the composition of their ground forces as early as 2001. Emerging doctrine failed to see a need for formations larger than a brigade. Corps headquarters were already cut and plans were being developed by 2006 to eliminate division headquarters as well.⁹¹ To further complicate future ground operations, following the 2003 US attack into Iraq, Israel believed the major threat to their east was gone, specifically Iraq and Syria, thus leaving little reason to retain a large armored force. Budgets were significantly cut, armored brigades were dismantled, and training resources for reserve forces diminished. The further manufacture and installment of critical equipment such as the Trophy Anti-missile System and the Markova Tank were curtailed due to budget constraints.⁹²

In the years leading up to the 2006 conflict, tactical proficiency within Army units continued to decline because of the lack of training resources and overall lack of emphasis leaders placed on preparing

⁸⁸ Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah and the War in Lebanon*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 60.

⁸⁹ Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 22-29

⁹⁰ Ibid., 23-24.

⁹¹ Ibid., 28.

⁹² Efraim Inbar, "How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War." *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer 2007, <http://www.meforum.org/1686/how-israel-bungled-the-second-lebanon-war>, (accessed August 26, 2009), 57-65.

for a ground conflict. In addition to large numbers of forces being deactivated and training curtailed, the leadership that commanded the remaining units was grossly unprepared for major combat operations. Due to the lack training resources and their involvement in policing duties during the Second Intifada, many of the battalion commanders, both regular and reserve, never observed or planned training for their unit. To further complicate the issue of fielding capable ground forces, senior leaders, such as division commanders and their staffs, were no longer training either due to the belief that division's were being dismantled in the near future. Officers assigned to Reserve Divisions viewed the assignment as a "rest period" from their involvement in the Second Intifada. By the summer of 2006, tactical proficiency was lost within the IDF, leaving a force that was unprepared for what was around the corner.⁹³

During the six years of the Second Intifada, Israeli Defense Forces consistently conducted operations outside their core warfighting duties. Perishable warfighting tasks were replaced by years of patrolling the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by all types of forces: infantry, armor, and artillery. The high operational tempo and budget cuts for ground forces during this period significantly reduced the available training opportunities, leaving some soldiers going years without training on their assigned vehicles. According to Israeli training doctrine at the time, reserve tank crews required a minimum of a five-day tank refresher course every year in order to maintain the minimal proficiency, yet most crews barely received that during the entire five years they were engaged in the Second Intifada and some never received any refresher prior to ground operations in Lebanon.⁹⁴ The heavy burdens of policing duty gave many younger soldiers a misconception of what combat was really like. Most soldiers within the IDF were too young to remember the last major Israeli combat operation that had taken place during the 1982

⁹³ Harel and Issacharoff. *34 Days*, 43-44.

⁹⁴ Matthew, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 27.

invasion of Lebanon.⁹⁵ The Israeli Defense Force's perceptions of their own superior capabilities and the false perception of *Hezbollah* force capabilities in 2006 led the IDF to believe that if the crisis escalated to major ground combat operations, the enemy would not be able to last longer than two weeks before they collapsed.⁹⁶ As the IDF quickly realized, the realities of this conflict would be significantly different and would require a vastly different skill set than what was required during the previous six years.

The Realities of Combat in Lebanon

Following the capture of the Israeli soldiers, the Israeli Air Force responded as part of Operation Ice Breaker. This operation was designed not to completely defeat *Hezbollah*, but rather to produce the “effects” that would cause them to disarm. Chief of the IDF General Staff, General Dan Halutz felt that air power alone could win the war and initially hesitated activating any reserves or allowing ground forces to participate in the war. The destruction of fifty-four *Hezbollah* Zelzal long range rocket launchers on the first night of the air campaign by the Israeli Air Force gave reason to believe that their strategy of aerial precision bombing would prevail in this campaign.⁹⁷ Unfortunately for Israel, *Hezbollah* immediately struck back with their own rocket campaign, launching as many as 200 122-mm Katyusha rockets a day into Israel. Many of these rockets were hidden in the middle of cities and placed on top of apartment buildings or fired from hardened bunkers, making their destruction extremely difficult without causing excessive collateral damage of the civilian infrastructure. By the end of the war, *Hezbollah* fired over 4,000 of these rockets, with over 900 landing in Israeli urban areas, inflicting 53 civilian casualties.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Harel and Issacharoff. *34 Days*, 45.

⁹⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman, George Sullivan, and William D. Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli – Hezbollah War*, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 55.

⁹⁷ Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 36-37.

⁹⁸ Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan. *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli – Hezbollah War*, 31, and Dilworth and Maital. *Fogs of War and Peace*, 141.

Upping the ante even further, following a series of attacks against the Beirut Airport and the establishment of an Israeli blockade along the entire coast of Lebanon, *Hezbollah* fired an Iranian-produced C-802 Noor guided missile at an Israeli ship, blowing a hole in its side and killing four crewmembers.⁹⁹

After several days of precision bombing failing to produce the desired results within Lebanon and an increasing number of *Hezbollah* rockets reaching Israeli cities, the Israeli Defense Force began to rethink their campaign strategy of relying solely on air strikes to achieve their desired objectives. After much resistance, General Halutz finally agreed to conduct the first major ground offensive into Lebanon towards the towns of Marun al-Ras. Shortly after crossing into Lebanon on July 17th, lead units from the Israeli Special Forces became bogged down after meeting with stiff resistance from *Hezbollah* forces, resulting in a series of protracted firefights.¹⁰⁰ In an effort to increase the pressure on the *Hezbollah* forces in Southern Lebanon, elements from three Armored Brigades and Battalion 101 from the Airborne Brigade attacked towards Maroun al-Ras on July 19th. These forces were also quickly overwhelmed with the fierce fighting and accurate anti-tank missile fires which destroyed numerous tanks and killed several IDF soldiers. One IDF soldier was quoted as saying: “They’re not fighting like we thought they would. In fact, they’re fighting harder.” These same observations concerning the fighting capabilities of the *Hezbollah* forces would be repeated over and over again as the IDF forces continued to encounter a determined foe that was not acting as intelligence reports had predicted.¹⁰¹

The *Hezbollah* forces fighting the IDF in Southern Lebanon in the summer of 2006 were significantly different than those previously encountered during the Intifada or even during the previous Israeli incursions into Lebanon. These forces were not the traditional guerrilla or irregular forces that

⁹⁹ Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 38.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 43-44.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 44.

melted away into the surrounding populations after the first contact; but instead were holding ground against the IDF armored forces, integrating effective fires, and in numerous instances, counterattacking using coordinated, larger- than-expected units. Even though many of the forces wore a distinguishable uniform and fought outside the protection of the civilian populated urban areas, they were not quite a standing conventional force either. The force employed by *Hezbollah* was more of a hybrid threat, employing every means available to counter the IDF, yet beholden to no one particular doctrine.¹⁰²

During the 34-day war, *Hezbollah* forces often defended from prepared positions, fighting protracted battles against IDF armored and infantry attacks. These forces held their ground in several locations such as Shaked Outpost, Marun ar Ras, Bind Jubal, and Tayyibah for periods ranging from several hours to multiple days. The extended periods of close quarters combat took a considerable toll on the attacking Israeli forces. Prior to the conflict starting, Israeli intelligence portrayed the *Hezbollah* forces in a similar fashion to other irregular forces previously encountered in other conflicts. After the first few engagements, the IDF realized that these forces were different. These forces were not quickly dissipating after each engagement prior to risking the loss of their own combat power. In many cases they were holding the ground at great cost to themselves and extracting a heavy toll on the attacking Israeli forces.¹⁰³

For their part, the IDF was not fully prepared for the type of combat that would ensue during this war with a determined *Hezbollah* force. The late call up of reserve forces prevented many of these units from conducting their final training prior to going into combat. Commanders on the front quickly realized that six years of policing duties left their newly arriving soldiers untrained, ill-prepared and lacking discipline and high morale. Some soldiers did not understand how to employ basic weapons such

¹⁰² Biddle and Friedman, *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare*, xi-xv.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 36-38.

as the light anti-tank weapons (LAWs) that would be critical to destroying defending Hezbollah forces in prepared defensive positions. Others arrived at staging areas lacking critical personal and unit equipment such as bulletproof vests, medical equipment, radios, night vision devices, ammunition, food and water.¹⁰⁴ Again and again, commanders on the ground complained about the poor quality of the soldiers. Many soldiers were not prepared for the intensive combat operations, nor the physical and emotional demands placed on them or their units during operations against *Hezbollah*.¹⁰⁵

During the final days of the war, the battle in the vicinity of Saluki is a prime example of the issues that plagued the IDF throughout this conflict. The 401st Armored Brigade's Ninth Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Effie Defrin received orders to maneuver his unit to Saluki to support further operations in Lebanon. From the start, he noticed the overall poor quality of numerous soldiers, who had been conducting security duties in Jericho at the start of the conflict. Infantry soldiers were lacking hand grenades, his tank crews did not know how to load smoke canisters, and those tanks that were moving often got stuck or threw their tracks because of the poor basic skills of the drivers and tank commanders. The lack of map reading abilities caused vehicle columns to get turned around on the wrong roads and indirect fires were improperly planned and executed, leaving tanks exposed in a kill zone when they should have been concealed in a smoke screen. During this mission, armored vehicles often maneuvered as close as twenty meters from the vehicle in front of it, making both vehicles easy prey for the incoming anti-tank fires. The ineffective use of their accompanying infantry completely negated the hopes of an effective combined arms team in this fight. By sunset on August 11th, it was clear that the unit failed to accomplish its mission and had to curtail further offensive operations. Twelve

¹⁰⁴ Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 49-50.

¹⁰⁵ Donnelly and Kagan, *Ground Truth*, 71.

officers and soldiers were killed, including two company commanders, over fifty others were wounded and 11 tanks were hit.¹⁰⁶

Aftermath

The 34-day war between Israel and *Hezbollah* left significant scars on both societies, with the most significant impact levied against the badly-shaken Israeli Defense Forces. The conflict left 161 casualties across Israel, 53 of whom were civilians, over 1000 Lebanese casualties, and the IDF seriously questioning their doctrine and overall military capabilities.¹⁰⁷ Questions concerning the events leading up to the war, IDF preparedness, and actions during the conflict were examined in the Israeli after action review of the conflict and published in the *Winograd Commission Report*.

A former IDF Commander and member of the Winograd Commission, Ze'ev Schiff expressed his frustrations following the conflict, stating that once again Israel entered a conflict unprepared and paid a high price for its miscalculation.¹⁰⁸ The commission further revealed that the reliance on air power's effects left a training and planning void in the ground force's capabilities. Too many officers within the Israeli Defense Forces promised that air power alone could deliver the rapid and decisive results for which the political and military leadership was looking and failed in the years leading up to the crisis to properly prepare and equip ground forces for major combat operations.¹⁰⁹ Prior to the start of the war, the Chief of the IDF General Staff visited a number of units conducting security missions in the vicinity of Tse'elim. He noted that it was easy for the IDF to "fall in love" with the policing duties conducted during

¹⁰⁶ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 219-224.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., vii.

¹⁰⁸ Dilworth and Maital, *Fogs of War and Peace*, 154.

¹⁰⁹ Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli – Hezbollah War*, 63.

the Second Intifada. Without measures to assess the professionalism and readiness levels within the IDF, tactical proficiency continued to fall to dismal levels.¹¹⁰

A lack of individual and collective training prior to the onset of the conflict was merely a symptom of a much larger problem within the Israeli ground forces. According to General Yoram Yair, part of the post-war *Winograd Commission* and initially charged to investigate the poor performance of the 91st Division, his observations encompass broader problems within most of the IDF. He initially notes that at all levels within the IDF, leaders were often not able to differentiate the requirements between the war that faced them and the previous security operations of the Second Intifada. Also leaders did not fully understand their role on the battlefield. General Yair noted that even brigade commanders were often in the rear, instead of leading and making decisions from the front. This lack of leader presence often added to the confusion felt by many during the 34-day war. He further notes that culture within the IDF was also under significant strain, leading to eroding professional capabilities of the commanders and soldiers. This degradation in the capability of the IDF resulted mainly from cuts in training resources over the previous several years.¹¹¹

Major General Sagi, the retired head of Amen (Israeli Military Intelligence) and a member of the *Winograd Commission* went on to state, “While not foreseeing the hard Israeli response, *Hezbollah* was prepared for this war and Israel wasn’t. Israel had only prepared a response, a limited operation, but wasn’t prepared beyond that. The ground forces found themselves unprepared, unqualified, unfamiliar with the terrain, and mostly not focused on the objectives.”¹¹² The realities of combat on the ground were extremely difficult for the IDF forces to overcome once ground combat operations were undertaken. The brutally harsh and honest criticism rendered against the IDF leadership and soldiers should give pause to

¹¹⁰ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 44-45.

¹¹¹ Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli – Hezbollah War*, 51-52.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 53.

the United States Army leadership. After eight years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with many units conducting operations outside their CMETL tasks, many units may now be greatly unprepared to conduct the missions for which they were originally designed, manned, and equipped to conduct.

Conclusions and Recommendations

We cannot accurately characterize the security environment of 2025; therefore we must hedge against this uncertainty by identifying and developing a broad range of capabilities. Further, we must organize and arrange our forces to create the agility and flexibility to deal with unknowns and surprises in the coming decades.

General Peter Pace
Chairman of the Joint Chief's off Staff
Assessment of the 2006 QDR¹¹³

The lethal, agile, expeditionary force the Army is building for the future is not designed around a particular threat, but as General Pace believed, it is built around the ability to react to uncertainty. In 2006, the Israeli Defense Forces wrongly perceived that the possibility of a major war had been greatly reduced and that in the event of a major crisis, there would ample time and opportunity to deploy and train ground forces prior to operations. This assumption left them lacking the agility and flexibility needed for that campaign.¹¹⁴ Surprise and uncertainty are constant elements of the 21st century operational environment. The challenge before the Army is building and maintaining a force capable of operating in this environment.

The diverse nature of the operational environment and the ever-changing nature of the potential conflicts that may emerge cause the Army to look at warfare in the future as neither regular or irregular, conventional or asymmetric, but most likely as a combination of all, morphing at multiple times throughout the conflict, causing units to operate along the spectrum of conflict with varying levels of

¹¹³ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2006, A-6.

¹¹⁴ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 43.

intensity.¹¹⁵ According to then-Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Multi-National Division- Baghdad adopted that mindset during the conduct of their full spectrum operations in 2004. A balanced approach to combat was needed, forcing units to operate along multiple lines of operation simultaneously, including combat operations, training security forces, restoring essential services, promoting governance, and economic development.¹¹⁶ The dilemma facing so many commanders is balancing the need to develop and maintain a force that retains its expeditionary capabilities needed in today's conflicts, while also maintaining each unit's CMETL proficiency. These proficiencies may eventually be called upon during these or future crises that emerge. There is no easy answer to this dilemma right now due to the high operational tempo, but the first step in the process is expanding the training time.

According to LTG James D. Thurman, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7, part of the answer lies within the ARFORGEN process. He further states that it is imperative to achieve dwell time goals of 1:2 for active forces and 1:4 for reserve forces. Achieving a significantly longer dwell time allows commanders and leaders additional time to not only integrate newly assigned Soldiers to their units and conduct the required training with newly-fielded equipment, but also to develop a training plan that potentially encompass both CMETL and DMETL tasks¹¹⁷ Providing ample opportunity for leaders at all levels, squad and platoon through company and battalion, to train their units on critical individual and collective tasks that support METL-focused training is critical to success in any operational environment.

Commanders cannot look at splitting up the available training time and developing separate training plans for the conventional operations and others for their theater-specific stability operations, but

¹¹⁵ Colin S. Gray, "The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War." *Parameters*, (Winter 2008 – 2009), 23.

¹¹⁶ MG Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirements for Full Spectrum Operations." *Military Review*, (July – AUG 2005), 4-17.

¹¹⁷ LTG James D. Thurman, "A Balanced Army for the Future Strategic Environment", *Army*, (October 2009), 190.

instead they have to look at the available training resources as a means of training for full spectrum operations in the 21st Century. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report acknowledges the complexity of the operational environment. It further recommended a force structure that was not specifically optimized for one particular threat, such as the on-going counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but rather a full spectrum of threats. For example, the Army is to be structured with 73 total brigade combat teams (BCTs): 40 infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs), 8 Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs), and 25 heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs).¹¹⁸ All of these forces bring specific capabilities that enable the joint force commander to operate under any condition along the entire spectrum of conflict.

FM 7-0, Training For Full Spectrum Operations acknowledges that commanders will have to identify tasks to train, prioritize training resources, and accept risk on certain tasks that cannot be trained given the limited resources. The dilemma of training CMETL to maintain long-term proficiency versus training DMETL to support a near-term mission faces every commander rotating through the ARFORGEN cycle.¹¹⁹ The risk to the force is measured in terms of the young lieutenants and sergeants that face the prospect of receiving minimal training on CMETL tasks, leaving them unprepared for a future contingency that they may be planning or leading. The uncertainties and surprises that faced the Israeli Defense Forces during the 2006 War will likely face the United States military in the future, if it does not fully grasp the concepts as outlined in the 2010 QDR: “prevailing in today’s wars while simultaneously preventing and deterring war in the future and preparing to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies.”¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, 45 - 47.

¹¹⁹ *Field Manual 7-0, Training For Full Spectrum Operations*, 4-10.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, v.

With guidance from FORSCOM and TRADOC, the United States Army Combined Arms Center – Collective Training Directorate developed a standardized set of Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) that support operations across the spectrum. This program focused standardized METLs down to brigade level to ensure that all similar type units across the army maintain proficiency on individual and collective tasks that support the full spectrum METL. This effort attempts to reduce the need to develop multiple sets of METL tasks and replace the old paradigm with a new approach of training against a standardized METL that support full spectrum operations. An IBCT, SBCT, or HBCT Full Spectrum METL includes: Conduct Command and Control, Conduct Offensive Operations, Conduct Defensive Operations, Conduct Security Operations, Conduct Stability Operations, Employ Fires, and Conduct Civil Support Operations for ARNG units only. Whereas a Fires Brigade Full Spectrum Operations METL includes: Conduct Command and Control, Integrate Lethal and Non-lethal Fires, Provide Lethal Fires, Conduct Stability Operations, and Conduct Civil Support Operations for ARNG units only.¹²¹

As the United States strategy and policy documents have previously stated, the operational environment is very dynamic and attempting to identify every threat and then building a force capable of dominating the environment in which it is operating is near impossible. Instead, the United States Army needs to focus on developing a wide array of capabilities, with the capacity of operating in a decisive manner across the entire spectrum of conflict, while retaining the flexibility and agility to adapt to changes rapidly. The maintenance of the full spectrum capabilities outlined in the standardized BCT Full Spectrum METLs is critical to providing the commander on the ground with as many options as possible. The Army absolutely needs to maintain its full spectrum capability, even while engaged in two counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Failure to retain such capabilities, coupled with

¹²¹ United States Army Combined Arms Center – Collective Training Directorate Interview and Brief conducted on January 27, 2010. The Point of Contact for the Information concerning standardized METLs is Mr. Ronald Coaxum, (913) 684-7230, ronald.coaxum@us.army.mil. Further specifics of the briefing are classified. Those requiring additional information may contact Mr. Coaxum.

the failure to train our junior officers and noncommissioned officers for the uncertain future, invites the same failure experienced by Israel during the 2006 War.

APPENDIX

United States Army Command and General Staff Officers Course Survey

“An Army to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century”

Purpose: The purpose of this survey was to identify the training challenges that mid-grade officers identified during the last several years while their units (Active, Reserve, and National Guard) were preparing for deployments to both Iraq and Afghanistan. The second purpose was to see if this population saw the “out of balance” problems facing the Army the same way senior leaders perceived the problem.

Conduct of Survey: The survey issued was a 5-point Likert Scale survey conducted within the United States Army Command and General Staff Officers Course.

POC: Maria L. Clark, (913) 758-3455, Instructional Systems Specialist / Program Evaluator, CGSC Quality Assurance Office, Maria.Clark1@conus.army.mil.

Please select your service.

Army	17	53.13 %
Army Reserves	11	34.38 %
Army National Guard	4	12.50 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

1. The Army's training approach between conventional and COIN operations is out of balance considering the threats facing the country.

Strongly Agree	3	9.38 %
Agree	10	31.25 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	9	28.13 %
Disagree	10	31.25 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

2. The country's greatest threat is from asymmetric threats, such as WMD and terrorism.

Strongly Agree	6	18.75 %
Agree	19	59.38 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	4	12.50 %
Disagree	3	9.38 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

3. The United States is likely to face a conventional threat in the next 5-10 years.

Agree	8	25.00 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	12	37.50 %
Disagree	9	28.13 %
Strongly Disagree	3	9.38 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

4. Maintaining a Full Spectrum capable Army is critical to future success

Strongly Agree	15	46.88 %
Agree	16	50.00 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	1	3.13 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

5. Training for stability operations is a greater priority than training for offensive and defensive operations.

Agree	8	25.00 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	9	28.13 %
Disagree	15	46.88 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

6. Offensive tasks (such as movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit) remain relevant in the current operational environment.

Strongly Agree	8	25.00 %
Agree	17	53.13 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	5	15.63 %
Disagree	1	3.13 %
Strongly Disagree	1	3.13 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

7. Defensive tasks (such as mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde) are no longer relevant in today's operational environment.

Strongly Agree	1	3.13 %
Agree	7	21.88 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	7	21.88 %
Disagree	13	40.63 %
Strongly Disagree	4	12.50 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

8. The military should assume risk in its preparation for conventional operations.

Strongly Agree	1	3.13 %
Agree	11	34.38 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	5	15.63 %
Disagree	13	40.63 %
Strongly Disagree	2	6.25 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

9. Using Soldiers outside their MOS greatly decreases their capability to conduct their core missions.

Strongly Agree	6	18.75 %
Agree	9	28.13 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	10	31.25 %
Disagree	7	21.88 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

10. Deploying units should focus their limited training time solely on their D-METL Tasks.

Strongly Agree	3	9.38 %
Agree	10	31.25 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	9	28.13 %
Disagree	7	21.88 %
Strongly Disagree	3	9.38 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

11. Maintaining proficiency in Core Offensive and Defensive METL tasks is critical to the Army and its ability to react to future contingencies.

Strongly Agree	9	28.13 %
Agree	18	56.25 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	5	15.63 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

12. Conducting non-traditional roles while deployed has degraded the ability of most artillery units to provide reliable, fast, and accurate fires.

Strongly Agree	5	15.63 %
Agree	9	28.13 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	15	46.88 %
Disagree	3	9.38 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

13. Maintaining proficiency in offensive and defensive Artillery METL tasks is not relevant for the contemporary operational environment.

Agree	2	6.25 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	11	34.38 %
Disagree	15	46.88 %
Strongly Disagree	4	12.50 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

14. Maintenance and logistical capabilities within the FSCs and BSBs is significantly degraded because mechanics are filling non-traditional roles while deployed.

Strongly Agree	1	3.13 %
Agree	10	31.25 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	12	37.50 %
Disagree	7	21.88 %
Strongly Disagree	2	6.25 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

15. Armored maneuver capabilities have significantly degraded due to lack of training opportunities between deployments.

Strongly Agree	4	12.50 %
Agree	7	21.88 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	16	50.00 %
Disagree	4	12.50 %
Strongly Disagree	1	3.13 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

16. Training Centers should remain MRE focused in order to prepare units for their in theater mission.

Strongly Agree	2	6.25 %
Agree	18	56.25 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	5	15.63 %
Disagree	7	21.88 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

17. COIN Training is of greater importance than training for conventional operations.

(Not Answered)	1	3.13 %
Agree	13	40.63 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	7	21.88 %
Disagree	8	25.00 %
Strongly Disagree	3	9.38 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

18. Junior leaders have lost critical skills needed to conduct operations in a high intensity conflict due to the focus on COIN tasks.

Strongly Agree	5	15.63 %
Agree	10	31.25 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	11	34.38 %
Disagree	5	15.63 %
Strongly Disagree	1	3.13 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

19. Leaders can quickly learn new tasks to adapt to a new operational environment.

Strongly Agree	7	21.88 %
Agree	22	68.75 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	2	6.25 %
Disagree	1	3.13 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

20. Senior leaders need to take a long term view of the operational environment and ensure junior leaders are prepared for Full Spectrum Operations.

Strongly Agree	14	43.75 %
Agree	16	50.00 %
Neither Agree / Disagree	2	6.25 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

21. In your last unit, what percentage of time did your unit spend training on deployment specific tasks?

Greater than 90%	2	6.25 %
75-89%	11	34.38 %
50-74%	9	28.13 %
25-49%	1	3.13 %
Less than 25%	9	28.13 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

22. In your last unit, what percentage of training time did your unit spend on training Core METL Tasks?

Greater than 90%	3	9.38 %
75-89%	5	15.63 %
50-74%	8	25.00 %
25-49%	10	31.25 %
Less than 25%	6	18.75 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

23. What percentage of pre-deployment training time do you feel units should spend maintaining core offensive and defensive competencies?

Greater than 90%	1	3.13 %
75-89%	10	31.25 %
50-74%	12	37.50 %
25-49%	7	21.88 %
Less than 25%	2	6.25 %
Total Responses	32	100.00 %

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